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Abstract: In this Article, we intend to fill a gap in the comparative law literature by adopt-
ing a case-based approach to comparative corporate law that highlights the important di-
mension of specific cases in corporate law matters and how identifiable, but limited issues 
arising from such case disputes are resolved in different jurisdictions. Our study is based on 
ten cases used in a wider research project and their solutions in ten countries: eight Euro-
pean countries, the United States, and Japan. We assess the solutions to these cases using 
quantitative methods of network and cluster analysis. We also seek to enquire whether con-
ceptual differences exist between countries in terms of the source, form, style, and sub-
stance of the legal rules which comprise their corporate laws. 
    The findings of this assessment are used to evaluate arguments developed in the aca-
demic comparative company literature which posit that the existence of fundamental differ-
ences in the protection of shareholders across countries reduces the scope for convergence 
in corporate law systems. The case-based evaluation is also applied to make a contribution 
towards other influential theories in comparative law, particularly the “legal origins” theo-
rem and the “legal transplants” debate. For example, while we find some evidence of legal 
transplants, we will show that the notion of legal origins has only limited value in today’s 
corporate law. Furthermore, the research has a public policy dimension since the existence 
or absence of differences matters for the question of whether formal harmonization of cor-
porate law in the EU, or further afield, is necessary, desirable, or at all possible. 
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Convergence, Legal Origins, and Transplants in Comparative Cor-
porate Law: A Case-Based and Quantitative Analysis  
 
DAVID CABRELLI & MATHIAS SIEMS∗ 
 
INTRODUCTION 
The global financial crisis of 2008 led to a stagnation, or even a decrease, in interna-
tional investments and cross-listings.1 However, this situation seems to be in the process of 
changing once again. Since the 2013 report accompanying the KOF Index of Globalization 
observes a slight recovery in the onward march of economic globalization,2 it can be ex-
pected that the internationalization of companies will also continue. It therefore remains 
crucial to understand how and why corporate laws differ across countries and how im-
provements, based on national or international models, may be made. The drive to enhance 
corporate laws and corporate governance standards is also reflected in the 2014 consulta-
tion by the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), which has 
                                                 
∗
 David L. Cabrelli, Senior Lecturer in Commercial Law, University of Edinburgh, United Kingdom. Mathias 
M. Siems, Professor of Commercial Law, University of Durham, United Kingdom. This article is based on 
Chapters 1 and 12 of COMPARATIVE COMPANY LAW: A CASE-BASED APPROACH (Mathias Siems & David 
Cabrelli eds., 2013). We are grateful to Hart Publishing for their permission to reproduce this material in 
modified form in this article, as well as to our national reporters who provided the raw data on which our find-
ings are based. The authors would also like to thank the anonymous reviewer and those present at the seminar 
at VU University, Amsterdam, the Netherlands, on Jan. 23, 2014 for their contributions.  
1
 Data are published by, e.g., the OECD, the World Bank, and the World Federation of Exchanges. See Guide 
to OECD International Direct Investment Statistics, UK DATA SERVICE, http://ukdataservice.ac.uk/use-
data/guides/dataset/international-investment.aspx; Indicators, WORLD BANK, 
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator; Statistics, WORLD FEDERATION OF EXCHANGES, http://www.world-
exchanges.org/statistics. 
2
 Press release, Mar. 1, 2013, available at http://globalization.kof.ethz.ch/. 
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launched a review of its 2004 Principles of Corporate Governance in order to consider “re-
cent developments in the corporate sector and capital markets.”3 
The primary objective of this Article is to add to the existing academic literature in 
the field of comparative corporate law,4 albeit by adopting a novel methodological ap-
proach to the subject. Up until twenty years ago, the academic literature on comparative 
corporate law tended to focus on the institutional structure of the corporation. For instance, 
discussions centered around whether companies had only one board of directors (“one-tier 
systems”) or whether there was a distinction between the management and supervisory 
board (“two-tier systems”),5 whether companies should establish committees (remunera-
tion, appointment, audit committees etc.), the identity of persons who could be appointed as 
a company’s auditor (independence, qualification etc.), and the division of powers between 
the board of directors and the shareholders in general meeting. While this approach is im-
portant, it overlooked the dimension of specific cases in corporate law matters and how the 
issues arising from disputes were resolved in different jurisdictions. In recent years, the re-
search agenda has moved on to analyze specific thematic topics in more detail from a com-
parative perspective, such as takeovers,6 derivative suits,7 and self-dealing.8 In this Article 
                                                 
3
 See OECD Principles of Corporate Governance, OECD, 
http://oecd.org/corporate/oecdprinciplesofcorporategovernance.htm. For a discussion of the OECD Principles 
see Mathias Siems & Oscar Alvarez-Macotela, The OECD Principles of Corporate Governance in Emerging 
Markets: A Successful Example of Networked Governance?, in NETWORKED GOVERNANCE, TRANSNATIONAL 
BUSINESS AND THE LAW 257 (Mark Fenwick, Steven Van Uytsel & Stefan Wrbka eds., 2014).  
4
 The main general books on comparative corporate law are: MADS ANDENAS & FRANK WOOLDRIDGE, EURO-
PEAN COMPARATIVE COMPANY LAW (2009); RADO BOHINC, COMPARATIVE COMPANY LAW: AN OVERVIEW 
ON US AND SOME EU COUNTRIES’ COMPANY LEGISLATION ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE (2011); ANDREAS 
CAHN & DAVID C. DONALD, COMPARATIVE COMPANY LAW (2010); ALAN DIGNAM & MICHAEL GALANIS, 
THE GLOBALIZATION OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE (2009); CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN CONTEXT (Klaus J. 
Hopt, Eddy Wymeersch, Hideki Kanda & Harald Baum eds., 2005); REINIER KRAAKMAN ET AL., THE ANAT-
OMY OF CORPORATE LAW (2d ed..2009); CORPORATE GOVERNANCE REGIMES—CONVERGENCE AND DIVER-
SITY (Joseph A. McCahery, Piet Moerland, Theo Raaijmakers & Luc Renneboog eds., 2002); COMPARATIVE 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: A FUNCTIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL ANALYSIS (Andreas M. Fleckner & Klaus J. 
Hopt eds., 2013).  
5
 See, e.g., CORPORATE BOARDS IN LAW AND PRACTICE: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS IN EUROPE (Paul Davies, 
Klaus Hopt, Richard Nowak & Gerard van Solinge eds., 2013); Paul Davies & Klaus J. Hopt, Boards in Eu-
rope—Accountability and Convergence, 61 AM. J. COMP. L. 301 (2013). 
6
 John Armour & David Skeel, Who Writes the Rules for Hostile Takeovers, and Why? The Peculiar Diver-
gence of US and UK Takeover Regulation, 95 GEO. L.J. 1727 (2007). 
7
 THE DERIVATIVE ACTION IN ASIA: A COMPARATIVE AND FUNCTIONAL APPROACH (Dan W. Puchniak, Har-
ald Baum & Michael Ewing-Chow eds., 2012); ARAD REISBERG, DERIVATIVE ACTIONS AND CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE: THEORY AND OPERATION (2007); X. LI, A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF SHAREHOLDERS’ DERIVA-
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we intend to follow in the same vein as that more recent non-structural and thematic aca-
demic literature to subject specific issues related to directors’ liability, creditor protection, 
and shareholders’ rights and duties to the scrutiny of a comparative assessment. One of the 
fundamental points to be made is that comparative similarities, differences, and trends in 
these topics may be best understood by analyzing how carefully designed hypothetical cas-
es would be solved in different countries. 
In the project underlying this Article, the laws of ten distinct jurisdictions—namely 
Spain, Italy, Germany, the United Kingdom, Poland, Finland, Latvia, France, the United 
States (Delaware was used as a proxy), and Japan—were addressed by national reporters 
we appointed for this purpose. Each national reporter solved ten hypothetical cases accord-
ing to their national law.9 The project, methodology, findings, and conclusions were set out 
in a book published in 2013. The process adopted is akin to the influential case-based com-
parative methodology used by the so-called Common Core project.10 However, the Com-
mon Core only examines private law in a narrow sense (contract, tort, etc.). Therefore, our 
project aimed to fill a gap in the comparative law literature by adopting a similar approach 
in the field of corporate law.11  
The present Article uses this comparative information in order to enquire whether 
conceptual differences exist between countries in terms of the source, form, style, or sub-
stance of the legal rules which comprise their corporate laws. The findings of this assess-
ment can be used to evaluate arguments developed in the academic literature which posit 
that the existence of fundamental differences in the protection of shareholders across coun-
                                                                                                                                                    
TIVE ACTIONS (2007); Robert B. Thompson & Randall S. Thomas, The Public and Private Faces of Deriva-
tive Lawsuits, 57 VAND. L. REV. 1764 (2004); Pearlie K.M. Choo, The Statutory Derivative Action in Singa-
pore—A Critical and Comparative Examination, 13 BOND L. REV. 81 (2001); Mark D. West, The Pricing of 
Shareholder Derivative Actions in Japan and the United States, 88 NW. U. L. REV. 1439 (1994); Deborah A. 
Demott, Shareholder Litigation in Australia and the United States: Common Problems, Uncommon Solutions, 
11 SYDNEY L. REV. 259 (1988). 
8
 Simeon Djankov, Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer, The Law and Economics 
of Self-Dealing, 88 J. FIN. ECON. 430 (2008). 
9
 COMPARATIVE COMPANY LAW: A CASE-BASED APPROACH (Mathias Siems & David Cabrelli eds., 2013). 
See also the reviews by Richard C. Nolan, 130 LAW Q. REV. 343 (2014); Demetrio Maltese, 72 CAMBRIDGE 
L.J. 768 (2013); Peter Watts, NEW ZEALAND L.J. 318 (2013). See also infra Part II. 
10
 COMPARATIVE COMPANY LAW: A CASE-BASED APPROACH, supra note 9, 16-18 
11
 See supra note 4 for existing works on comparative corporate law. 
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tries reduces the scope for convergence in corporate law systems.12 The results can also re-
veal the constituencies (directors, minority shareholders, majority shareholders, creditors, 
etc.) preferred in the cases in the differing jurisdictions, which can be plotted and evaluated. 
The case-based evaluation is also applied to make a contribution towards other influential 
theories in comparative law, particularly the “legal origins” theorem and the “legal trans-
plants” debate. Furthermore, the research has a public policy dimension since the existence 
or absence of differences matters for the question of whether formal harmonization of cor-
porate law in the European Union (EU) or further afield is necessary, desirable, or at all 
possible.13 
To set the scene, Part I outlines central debates in the comparative corporate law lit-
erature and how the ten cases drawn have the potential to provide useful insights into the 
relevance and soundness of the arguments advanced in terms of those debates. Part II ex-
plains the case-based approach in more detail. In particular, the focus is on the form, style, 
and substance of the ten cases, within the rubric of the following themes: (1) directors’ li-
ability; (2) creditor protection; and (3) shareholders’ rights and protection and the flexibility 
of corporate law. This Part also considers the method and practicalities of adopting a com-
parative case-based approach, as well as the coding of twenty components from the ten cas-
es. In Part III, the focus shifts to the main findings of the case-based research, including 
some of the implications of the results for salient debates in the area of comparative corpo-
rate law. Finally, the Article ends with a brief summary and conclusion. 
I. CENTRAL DEBATES IN COMPARATIVE CORPORATE LAW 
A. Introduction 
One of the principal objectives of the case-based research we adopt is to identify 
and understand possible differences and similarities between legal systems in corporate 
                                                 
12
 For references on the convergence debate, see infra notes 14–17.  
13
 For the EU debate see, e.g., Modernisation of Company Law and Enhancement of Corporate Governance, 
EUROPEAN COMMISSION, http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/company/modern/index_en.htm.  
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law. By identifying the affinities between corporate law regimes as well as the extent, na-
ture, and scope of the disparities, the project has the potential to offer insights into the va-
lidity of three of the most central ongoing debates in the field of comparative corporate law: 
the “convergence versus divergence,” the “legal origins,”  and the “legal transplants” de-
bates. All of these debates are cross-cutting and overlap to some degree, which may be at-
tributed to the fact that each of them at some level addresses the extent to which a single, 
carefully prescribed framework can ever function as the optimal “default operating system” 
of corporate law.  
In the remainder of Part I, we discuss these three debates. In addition, the final par-
agraphs of the next three subsections consider how the case-based approach of this Article 
(and its underlying project) has the potential to add important insights to these debates.  
B. Convergence, Divergence, and Corporate Governance Systems 
First, the findings of the research have the capacity to make a contribution towards 
the “convergence versus divergence” debate in corporate law. The key work in this vein is 
the article by Henry Hansmann and Reinier Kraakman which argued that the shareholder-
oriented model of modern U.S. corporate law would ultimately “win out” in a competition 
with the more traditional managerial model of U.S. corporate law and the stakeholder- and 
state-oriented models of civil law countries.14 Indeed, there is evidence that the legal sys-
tems of continental Europe and Asia have copied investor-related provisions from U.S. law, 
without there being a converse feedback into U.S. law. Thus, lawmakers in other countries 
are keen to improve the potential of their companies to attract capital, due to intensified in-
ternational competition. U.S. law is particularly influential here as large foreign companies 
are often listed on U.S. markets, U.S. institutional investors have special weight, and the 
United States can exert political pressure as a world power.15 Further, particular studies 
                                                 
14
 Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The End of History for Corporate Law, 89 GEO. L.J. 439 (2001). 
See also infra Parts III.D and IV. 
15
 MATHIAS M. SIEMS, CONVERGENCE IN SHAREHOLDER LAW 226–27 (2008). 
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have supplied evidence of convergence,16 with a number of factors such as securities law 
and stock market requirements coalescing to dilute the differences between corporate law 
regimes across the world.17 This convergence is partly attributable to the growth of global-
ization and, in particular, the pressures exerted by competition, interest groups, and imita-
tion.  
 It is no exaggeration to say that Hansmann and Kraakman’s article generated a for-
midable reaction amongst comparative corporate law scholars across the world. But many 
contested their arguments. Some scholars objected that path dependencies still play an im-
portant role. As regards the law, this may be the result of fundamentally different legal 
mentalities between common and civil law countries,18 and in terms of corporate govern-
ance, historical and cultural differences may persist, reflecting different types of market 
economies.19 Proponents of “path-dependence” theory argue that the structure of a jurisdic-
tion’s corporate governance system and the shape of its corporate laws are conditioned by 
its cultural, social, economic, and political past.20 Hence, “history matters,” since once a 
jurisdiction has embarked upon a particular path, legal systems become “locked in” and 
conditioned by institutions built up within the system over the years. As a result, strong 
complementarities between different institutions in the system are generated, rendering it 
                                                 
16
 The scholarship has pointed to a myriad of diverse possible modes of convergence, such as “formal,” “func-
tional,” “contractual,” “hybrid,” “normative,” and “institutional” convergence. See the various contributions 
in Ronald J. Gilson, Globalizing Corporate Governance: Convergence of Form or Function, 49 AM. J. COMP. 
L. 329, 337–50 (2001); Paul Rose, EU Company Law Convergence Possibilities After Centros, 11 TRANS-
NAT’L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 121, 134–35 (2001); Curtis J. Milhaupt, Creative Norm Destruction: The Evo-
lution of Nonlegal Rules in Japanese Corporate Governance, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 2083, 2125–28 (2001); Da-
vid Charny, The German Corporate Governance System, COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 145, 165 (1998). For different 
forms of convergence see also SIEMS, supra note 15, 23–24. 
17
 For the debate, see, e.g., John C. Coffee, The Future as History: The Prospects for Global Convergence in 
Corporate Governance and its Implications, 93 NW. U. L. REV. 641, 679–80 (1999); Douglas M. Branson, 
The Very Uncertain Prospect of “Global” Convergence in Corporate Governance, 34 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 
321 (2001); CONVERGENCE AND PERSISTENCE IN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 2-6 (Jeffrey N. Gordon & Mark 
J. Roe eds., 2004). 
18
 Cf., not specifically on corporate law, PIERRE LEGRAND, LE DROIT COMPARÉ (2006); Pierre Legrand, Euro-
pean Legal Systems are not Converging, 45 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 52 (1996). 
19
 See, e.g., THOMAS CLARKE, INTERNATIONAL CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: A COMPARATIVE APPROACH 266 
(2008); Branson, supra note 17, at 321.  
20
 See BRIAN CHEFFINS, CORPORATE OWNERSHIP AND CONTROL: BRITISH BUSINESS TRANSFORMED 55–56 
(2008); Mark J. Roe, Chaos and Evolution in Law and Economics, 109 HARV. L. REV. 641, 653–60 (1996); 
Ronald J. Gilson, Corporate Governance and Economic Efficiency: When Do Institutions Matter?, 74 WASH. 
U. L. Q. 327, 329–34 (1996); Coffee, supra note 17, at 646–47, 660–61. 
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difficult and inefficient for that jurisdiction to suddenly shift direction by introducing an 
altogether novel set of institutions. For this reason, “path-dependence” proponents argue 
that the uniqueness of corporate governance systems ought to be strengthened and permit-
ted to evolve organically in accordance with the existing legal, political, social, and eco-
nomic infrastructure.21 More nuanced positions are also possible. For instance, it could be 
said that, today, legal systems do not differ primarily because of different legal families, but 
rather on account of their belonging to a particular regional group. In particular, this may be 
the case in Europe, where the EU has harmonized some aspects of corporate law and the 
Europeanization of economic and legal thinking may also have led to convergence on other 
topics. 
Other commentators have been critical on different grounds. Some have been of the 
view that the effect of regulatory competition amongst jurisdictions runs counter to conver-
gence, leading inexorably to greater divergence amongst legal systems as each jurisdiction 
competes and engages in a “race to the bottom” to attract incorporations.22 Further reasons 
advanced to explain why we ought to be skeptical about the potential for such convergence 
include cultural constraints, political-economic barriers, and the variations across jurisdic-
tions in the legal rules addressing the protection of shareholders.  
 In particular, the arguments against convergence theory are closely connected with 
the divergence in the structure of share ownership of companies one finds in common law 
and civil law countries. In the capitalist market economies of common law jurisdictions 
such as the United Kingdom and the United States—which are categorized as “liberal mar-
ket economies” in the “varieties of capitalism” literature in the field of comparative politi-
cal economy23—the corporate governance system is referred to as an “outsider/arm’s 
                                                 
21
 Lucian Bebchuk & Mark Roe, A Theory of Path Dependence in Corporate Ownership and Governance, 52 
STAN. L. REV. 127 (1999); Udo C. Braendle & Juergen Noll, On the Convergence of National Corporate 
Governance Systems, 17 J. INTERDISC. ECON. 57 (2006); Mark Roe, Some Differences in Corporate Structure 
in Germany, Japan and United States, 102 YALE L.J. 1928 (1993); Gilson, supra note 20. 
22
 Ronald J. Daniels, Should Provinces Compete? The Case for a Competitive Corporate Law Market, 36 
MCGILL L.J. 138 (1991); Rose, supra note 16, at 121. 
23
 See, e.g.,VARIETIES OF CAPITALISM: THE INSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATIONS OF COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE 
(Peter Hall & David Soskice eds., 2001); BEYOND VARIETIES OF CAPITALISM: CONFLICT, CONTRADICTIONS, 
AND COMPLEMENTARITIES IN THE EUROPEAN ECONOMY (Bob Hancké, Martin Rhodes & Mark Thatcher eds., 
2007). 
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length” system of ownership and control. Ownership of the shares of large public corpora-
tions quoted on the capital markets in such systems is widely dispersed, with an absence of 
dominant controlling shareholders.24 Some scholars have argued that the main focus of cor-
porate laws in such jurisdictions is on protecting shareholders as a class from conduct of 
managers and directors that is prejudicial to shareholder interests, given that the latter are in 
a position to further their own interests at the expense of shareholders. As such, the “agency 
costs” to be tackled here are of a “vertical” nature in dispersed share ownership systems.25 
Furthermore, a large degree of emphasis is placed on corporate disclosure and market con-
trol by outsiders. This can be contrasted with “co-ordinated market economies” in the “va-
rieties of capitalism” literature, where the corporate governance system is “insider/control-
oriented” in nature. This taxonomy roughly maps onto the corporate law regimes of the civ-
il law jurisdictions where the share ownership of public corporations is concentrated in a 
single or a few blockholder controlling shareholders.26 Such systems are characterized by 
weak minority shareholder protection, a phenomenon which is largely attributable to the 
ability of controlling shareholders to extract private benefits by virtue of their dominance 
and control. Since the governance of companies in such “insider/control-oriented” systems 
is closely co-ordinated between management and the blockholding controlling sharehold-
ers, many commentators27 contend that corporate law protections in civil law jurisdictions 
are designed to protect minority shareholders. The argument runs that the “agency costs” 
                                                 
24
 See Simon Deakin, Richard Hobbs, Sue Konzelmann & Frank Wilkinson, Anglo-American Corporate Gov-
ernance and the Employment Relationship: A Case to Answer?, 4 SOCIO-ECON. REV. 155, 159–60 (2006); 
Klaus Hopt, Comparative Corporate Governance: The State of the Art and International Regulation, 59 AM. 
J. COMP. L. 1, 9 (2011). 
25
 See KRAAKMAN ET AL., supra note 4, at 29–32, 35–38; CHEFFINS, supra note 20, at 4–7. 
26
 See, e.g., Marco Becht & Colin Mayer, Introduction, in THE CONTROL OF CORPORATE EUROPE (Fabrizio 
Barca & Marco Becht eds., 2001); Mara Faccio & Larry H. P. Lang, The Ultimate Ownership of Western Eu-
ropean Corporations, 65 J. FIN. ECON. 365 (2002); Stijn Claessens, Simeon Djankov & Larry H.P. Lang, The 
Separation of Ownership and Control in East Asian Corporations, 58 J. FIN. ECON. 81 (2000); Ronald J. Gil-
son, Controlling Shareholders and Corporate Governance: Complicating the Comparative Taxonomy, 119 
HARV. L. REV. 1641 (2006). 
27
 See KRAAKMAN ET AL., supra note 4, at 29–32, 35–38; Cheffins supra note 20, at 4–7; Erik Berglöf, A Note 
on the Typology of Financial Systems, in COMPARATIVE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ESSAYS AND MATERIALS 
151-64  (Klaus Hopt & Eddy Wymeersch eds., 1997); John Armour, Simon Deakin & Sue Konzelmann, 
Shareholder Primacy and the Trajectory of UK Corporate Governance, 41 BR. J. IND. RELAT. 531, 533 
(2003); Brian Cheffins, Putting Britain on the Roe Map: The Emergence of the Berle–Means Corporation in 
the United Kingdom, in CORPORATE GOVERNANCE REGIMES: CONVERGENCE AND DIVERSITY 147 (Joseph A. 
McCahery, Piet Moerland, Theo Raaijmakers & Luc Renneboog eds., 2002). 
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which arise in civilian “insider/control-oriented” jurisdictions are horizontal, i.e. attribut-
able to a misalignment of the interests of majority shareholders and minority shareholders, 
rather than a vertical misalignment between the interests of directors and shareholders gen-
erally as a class, which is predominant in common law jurisdictions.28  
 The debate as to which of the “outsider/arm’s length” or “insider/control-oriented” 
systems of ownership and control is superior or more efficient has not been resolved: the 
jury is still out. With its emphasis on case-based problem-solving across common law and 
civil law jurisdictions, the approach we pursue in the present article has the potential to test 
the descriptive relevance of the dichotomy struck in the literature between “outsider/arm’s 
length” and “insider/control-oriented” systems of corporate governance. If the results point 
towards the existence of legal techniques in civilian jurisdictions to constrain horizontal 
agency costs in preference to vertical agency costs, this will furnish some support for the 
position adopted in the literature. Likewise, if the case-based methodology reveals that 
common law jurisdictions pay less attention to legal mechanisms whose purpose it is to re-
strict horizontal agency costs, it will serve to make a contribution to the “convergence ver-
sus divergence” debate. The case-based approach is particularly well suited to such an en-
deavor, since the solutions to the cases across the selected common law and civil law juris-
dictions can be compared and contrasted with the constituency favored by each of the solu-
tions duly identified and coded.29 
C. Legal Origins and Related Taxonomies 
A closely related debate revolves around the relevance of the “legal origins” theo-
rem.30 This theorem is connected to the wider notion of “legal families” in the general 
                                                 
28
 A third kind of “agency cost” is that which arises between shareholders and non-shareholder constituencies 
such as suppliers, creditors, employees, etc. See KRAAKMAN ET AL., supra note 4, at 35–38; Cheffins, supra 
note 20, at 4–7. 
29
 See further infra Part IV.D. 
30
 See, e.g., Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer & Robert Vishny, Law and Finance, 
106 J. POLIT. ECON. 1113 (1998); Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer, Corporate 
Ownership Around the World, 54 J. FIN. 471 (1999); Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei 
Shleifer & Robert Vishny, Investor Protection and Corporate Governance, 58 J. FIN. ECON. 3 (2000); Edward 
L. Glaeser & Andrei Shleifer, Legal Origins, 117 Q. J. ECON. 1193 (2002); Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-
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comparative law literature (as well as path-dependency theory, considered above). Thus, 
the following starts with a review of the legal family classifications. 
The core idea of legal families is that the diversity of legal systems around the 
world is not random but that groups of countries share common features in terms of legal 
history, legal thinking, and positive rules. Particular relevance is attributed to the distinction 
between common and civil law countries: common law and civil law are said to “constitute 
the basic building blocks of the legal order,”31 and this distinction is also seen as the “most 
fundamental and most discussed issue in comparative law.”32  
 In particular, common law and civil law are said to differ in their relevant sources of 
law and legal methods. In the civil law, the main source of law is statute law, underpinned 
by academic writings. The main pieces of legislation are “codes,” which provide a logical, 
systematic, and coherent set of rules to be applied by judges in a deductive and legalistic 
way. The common law, by contrast, is at its core case law: the judiciary reason inductively 
from case to case, paying close attention to the facts and remaining constantly aware that 
such reasoning is not strictly logical but is also based on common sense.33 Thus, in the 
common law, not only do the judiciary aim to solve individual disputes, but their decisions 
are a means of developing the law “from below,” with previous judgments acting as prece-
dents, some of which will be binding in future cases; hence, the common law is sometimes 
said to have an advantage in terms of adaptability.34 Common law judges are also said to be 
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quences of Legal Origins, 46 J. ECON. LIT. 285 (2008) [hereinafter La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes & Shleifer, 
Economic Consequences]; Djankov et al., supra note 8. 
31
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Smits ed., 2d ed. 2012). 
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 UGO MATTEI, COMPARATIVE LAW AND ECONOMICS 70 (1997). 
33
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34
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31 J. COMP. ECON. 653 (2003). 
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more prepared to display judicial creativity and are praised for being “market-wise,” for 
instance, in guaranteeing “freedom of contract.”35 
Meanwhile, judges in civil law countries are said to reason very differently. They 
have discretion in interpreting statutory law, but once this is completed, they are mere “law-
appliers” expected to follow a strict legal syllogism: first, they identify the legal rule and 
how it should be interpreted; second, they subsume the facts within these legal rules; and, 
third, they apply the consequences of the legal rules.36 Since court decisions are only bind-
ing between the parties to the dispute (“inter partes”), case law is typically not regarded as 
a source of law. Moreover, this difference between judges in common and civil law coun-
tries can be related to differences in appointment and status: while in the former countries, 
it is typically experienced lawyers who are appointed or elected as judges, the latter coun-
tries usually have a career judiciary with an arguably less distinguished social status.37 
 It is also often said that the role of legal scholarship reinforces the extent of the civil 
law and common law divide. The civil law tradition is associated with the concept of 
“learned law,” which is a stronger trend in Germany than France , but not entirely irrelevant 
in the latter jurisdiction. In particular, law professors have had a strong influence on the 
character of German law, in contrast to the importance of the judiciary in England and the 
legislature in France.38 For example, legal scholars perform a key role in the statutory inter-
pretation of legislation, with this approach particularly evident in Germany. They produce 
detailed multi-volume annotated guides on the main codes, and monographs, textbooks, and 
journals also deal extensively with the interpretation of statutory law. Often, then, what 
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emerges is a predominant view (herrschende Lehre in Germany, la doctrine in France) 
which is treated as being as authoritative as the positive law itself.39 
By marrying the “legal families” approach with comparative corporate law, a par-
ticular variant of the former—referred to as the “legal origins” theorem in shorthand—has 
gained a considerable degree of currency, occupying vital territory in the field of compara-
tive law. The principal contention advanced by the “legal origins” theorem was propounded 
in a series of articles penned by Rafael La Porta and colleagues. The study conducted by La 
Porta et al. used a quantitative methodology in order to examine the differences in share-
holder protection in forty-nine countries and its impact on financial development. For the 
purposes of measuring the law, eight variables were used as proxies for shareholder protec-
tion: “one share one vote,” “proxy by mail allowed,” “shares not blocked before the meet-
ing,” “cumulative voting,” “oppressed minorities mechanism,” “pre-emptive rights to new 
issues,” “share capital required to call an extraordinary shareholder meeting,” and “manda-
tory dividend.” For each variable, every country in the study was coded as “1” where 
shareholder protection was present, and as “0” where it was not.40 La Porta et al. found that 
corporate law regimes grounded in the tradition of the common law were more protective 
of shareholders than civilian systems: 
Compared to French civil law, common law is associated with (a) better inves-
tor protection, which in turn is associated with improved financial develop-
ment, better access to finance, and higher ownership dispersion, (b) lighter 
government ownership and regulation, which are in turn associated with less 
corruption, better functioning labor markets, and smaller unofficial economies, 
and (c) less formalized and more independent judicial systems, which are in 
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turn associated with more secure property rights and better contract enforce-
ment.41 
The argument posits that the direct correlation between regimes which protect shareholders 
and the sophistication of the state of the capital markets and financial development of a ju-
risdiction means that civil law countries suffer from a weaker level of stock market devel-
opment. This has developed into a highly influential body of academic literature,42 particu-
larly via the Doing Business reports of the World Bank.43 The ascendancy of the common 
law position is said to be attributable to a low level of government ownership and regula-
tion of corporations, less formalized judicial procedures, and the emphasis it attaches to the 
reasoned and incremental development of corporate law through a highly independent judi-
ciary.44 Common law regimes are cast as pursuing a market-based approach, where the 
shareholder’s individual interests are to the fore. Moreover, in these countries, capital mar-
kets are seen as more developed, so that interest in shares is broader and shareholder own-
ership is often dispersed.45 In civil law countries, by contrast, concentrated ownership struc-
tures mostly prevail in publicly traded companies.46 Since management cooperates with the 
dominant shareholders, relations within the company are more important than control 
through the markets. This “insider model” is to be explained by the fact that banks and em-
ployees hold a strong position. The firm is accordingly run not primarily in the interests of 
shareholders, but in the interests of all stakeholders in the undertaking. In these countries 
too, state influence has a large part to play, so that political views are brought to bear inside 
the companies. 
 Further distinctions are frequently made. For instance, since the category of non-
Anglo-Saxon countries is very broad, it is suggested that one must distinguish between a 
German, Latin (in the sense of the Romance language countries, i.e. Italy, France and 
Spain), and Japanese (or Asian) model of corporate governance. In this vein, for example, it 
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may be said that only the German model tends to present a mandatory division between the 
management and supervisory board, that the Latin and Japanese models are more network-
oriented than the German model, and that stock markets are more important in the German 
and Japanese models than in the Latin model.47 Another distinction is between the corpo-
rate law and corporate governance systems of developed, developing, and transition econ-
omies. In particular, the transition economies of Eastern Europe and Asia have received 
close attention since in the 1990s, they were viewed as an interesting test case on the switch 
from socialism to a system of privately owned companies.48 
 The “legal origins” theorem has generated a great deal of controversy. The critiques 
vary from concerns about the failure of the theory to consider the political determinants of 
corporate law and corporate governance systems to the adequacy of the methodological ap-
proach adopted by La Porta et al. and the assumptions that underpin the conclusions drawn 
from the empirical results.49 For example, on the political front, Mark Roe refers to the ten-
dency of governments of a “left-wing” social democratic hue to favor the interests of labor 
over capital; in such systems, the government eschews corporate laws protecting sharehold-
ers as a class in order to prioritize the demands of labor, which leads to greater conflicts 
between the interests of shareholders and directors/managers. The resulting greater oppor-
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tunities for vertical agency costs are attributable to the policy preferences of those “left-
wing” governments with a social democratic tradition.50 
 Turning to the methodological deficiencies, the finding that robust shareholder 
rights lead to more effective and efficient capital markets and financial development was 
reached by La Porta et al. on the basis of a limited range of coded variables51 and “cross-
sectional data on the [company] laws of countries in the late 1990s, with no systematic cod-
ing of legal change over time.”52 Studies conducted on the basis of longitudinal time-series 
coding systems have demonstrated that the evidence for a correlation between legal origins 
and stock market development is much more tenuous.53 Moreover, these studies revealed 
that the level of shareholder protection in civil law regimes has been catching up with 
common law jurisdictions in recent years.54 Subsequent research has also identified many 
coding errors,55 and when the index is recalibrated to remove them, the correlations found 
by La Porta et al. simply disappear.56 A number of additional problems have been found, 
relating to both the legal and the econometric elements of these studies.57 It is also not en-
tirely self-evident that similarities and differences between legal systems can be explained 
by the distinction between countries with English, French, and German legal origin. Since 
countries of the same legal origin are often neighboring countries with a similar culture, La 
Porta et al.’s results may simply show that geographic vicinity and a common culture make 
it likely that the laws of two countries influence each other. In itself, such a conclusion ap-
pears entirely unremarkable. Moreover, historical linkages between countries may have be-
come weaker as a consequence of the convergence of legal and economic systems.  
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 Turning to the criticism of the assumptions underpinning the findings reached by La 
Porta et al., Katharina Pistor propounds three fallacies which lie at the heart of the “legal 
origins” theorem. First, there is the “extrapolation fallacy”—the unsubstantiated assertion 
that common law systems with stronger legal protections for shareholders invariably incen-
tivize smaller investors to save their money in shares, leading to a broader investor base and 
greater capital market development.58 Second, Pistor advances the “transmission problem,” 
which criticizes the supposed unidirectional impact of legal origin on specific legal provi-
sions in regulations, statutes, and case law, and on more efficient economic outcomes.59 
Here, La Porta et al. fail to address the possible feedback between legal origins, specific 
legal provisions, and stock market development, i.e. reverse causality. Finally, there is the 
“exogeneity paradox” whereby La Porta et al. assume that a country’s legal origin is ex-
ogenous and thus independent of the political, social, economic, and cultural context. In-
stead, there is evidence which shows that the state of a jurisdiction’s stock market and eco-
nomic development is dependent on a number of factors, including political and economic 
events and shocks.60  
Aware of these criticisms, La Porta et al. subsequently refined their methodological 
approach, producing an index that encompassed a broader range of themes than the original 
anti-director rights index. Two papers were published,61 the first of which examined the 
ease of private and public enforcement of rules designed to constrain self-dealing, with the 
private means of enforcement duly divided into ex ante and ex post constraints.62 The find-
ings pointed to correlations of statistical importance in relation to the state of development 
of a jurisdiction’s stock market, on the one hand, and the robustness of its public and pri-
vate enforcement of self-dealing rules on the other. Meanwhile, there were also statistically 
significant correlations between the extent of concentration of share ownership in a juris-
diction’s public corporations and the degree of ex post private regulation of self-dealing. 
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The second paper63 sought to address some of the more fundamental critiques of their orig-
inal empirical investigation. Having recalibrated their empirical tools, the authors nonethe-
less reaffirmed “the [basic] idea that legal origins—broadly interpreted as highly persistent 
systems of social control of economic life—have significant consequences for the legal and 
regulatory framework of the society, as well as for economic outcomes.”64 
 We submit that the case-based approach adopted here has the ability to offer some 
input into the legal origins paradigm. It compares jurisdictions according to whether they 
are protective of directors, majority shareholders, minority shareholders, or creditors, as 
determined through carefully constructed hypothetical cases. Although one cannot go so far 
as to contend that the findings of such a case-based methodology will operate to reveal the 
rationales for divergences in shareholder protection across the selected jurisdictions, there 
is considerable force in the view that it will serve to capture nuances in the level of share-
holder protection which the cruder “binary type” methodological approach of La Porta et al. 
is unable to achieve. Moreover, it has the added attraction of possessing the capacity to ex-
pose the differences in the source/form and style of the legal rules that function to confer 
protection on the various constituencies of directors, shareholders, and directors.65 
D. Legal Transplants in Corporate Law 
Finally, we move on to consider the relevance of the case-based methodology de-
ployed in this Article to the “legal transplants” debate in the comparative corporate law lit-
erature. This debate is also closely linked to the “convergence versus divergence” and “le-
gal origins” debates. The “legal transplants” theory asserts that it is “socially easy”66 to lift 
a rule or system of law from one jurisdiction to another. The theory was developed by Alan 
Watson in his studies on Roman law. The underlying point made by Watson, which is sig-
nificant for the case-based project adopted here, is that law is an autonomous phenomenon 
and can be divorced from the social, cultural, economic, and political background within 
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which it operates. Instead, the legal tradition, rather than those contextual factors, is more 
important in determining whether the adoption of a particular rule or body of law by one 
particular legal system from another (a) ought to be pursued in normative terms and (b) will 
be successful.67 For that reason, Watson rejects the contention that contextual features 
ought to be given wider consideration prior to any legal borrowing for fear that the recipi-
ent legal system will reject the transplant.  
This point is developed further by Roger Cotterrell, who draws a distinction be-
tween instrumental law and culturally based law. Unlike family law, which is conditioned 
by a jurisdiction’s social and cultural context, and constitutional and administrative law, 
which are shaped by its political culture, Cotterrell argues that company and commercial 
law are relatively culturally neutral in nature, since such laws are inextricably linked to 
“economic interests rather than national customs or sentiments.”68 For that reason, corpo-
rate laws are more easily transplantable than family or succession laws, and there is less 
scope for them to be rejected when borrowed by a host jurisdiction with a wholly distinct 
contextual background from that of the home jurisdiction. 
 However, not all scholars are convinced by Watson’s theory. The skeptics can be 
grouped into two camps, namely the contextualists and the culturalists. First, the contextu-
alists reject the idea that law is an exogenous phenomenon and will be accepted by a host 
jurisdiction irrespective of its culture and context. For example, Otto Kahn-Freund takes the 
position that “any attempt to use a pattern of law outside the environment of its original 
country entails a risk of rejection . . . [and] its use requires a knowledge not only of the for-
eign law but also of its social and above all political contexts.”69 The difference between 
the contextualists and the culturalists is a matter of degree, since the latter take the more 
extreme position that the notion of legal transplants should be rejected outright. The leading 
proponent of the culturalist argument is Pierre Legrand, who asserts that “[i]n any meaning-
                                                 
67
 Id. at 108. See also Alan Watson, Society’s Choice and Legal Change, 9 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1473 (1980–
1981).  
68
 Roger Cotterrell, Is There a Logic of Legal Transplants?, in ADAPTING LEGAL CULTURES 71, 82 (David 
Nelken & Johannes Feest eds., 2001) 
69
 Otto Kahn-Freund, On Uses and Misuses of Comparative Law, 37 MOD. L. REV. 1, 27 (1974); Lawrence M. 
Friedman, Some Comments on Cotterrell and Legal Transplants, in ADAPTING LEGAL CULTURES, supra note 
68, at 95. 
 21 
 
ful sense of the term, ‘legal transplants’ . . . cannot happen.”70 Here the argument is that 
once received, a rule or system of law is no longer comparable to its original incarnation in 
the home jurisdiction. Instead, the form and style of the rule or system of law is refined and 
shaped by the local context, environment, and culture to the extent that it no longer makes 
sense to talk of the subject of study as a “legal transplant.” 
 The methodology adopted in the study that forms the basis of this Article seeks to 
test some of these theories, particularly in light of the Japanese experience and the 2004 
accession of Poland and Latvia to the EU. It is often said that the latter two jurisdictions, 
particularly Latvia, share affinities with the German model of corporate law, and that the 
Japanese system imported a number of corporate law rules from the United States follow-
ing the Second World War. Therefore, the case-based approach offers scope to make a con-
tribution to the legal transplants debate. It will do so by reflecting on whether the case solu-
tions offer any evidence of the extent to which formal or functional transplants have suc-
ceeded.71 
II. THE PROJECT, ITS CASES, AND ITS COMPONENTS 
A. Introduction 
The case-based research project included ten hypothetical cases, each of which con-
tained two components that can be characterized as legal issues for resolution, this generat-
ing a total of twenty components. Ten jurisdictions were chosen for review. National re-
porters were appointed for each of the ten jurisdictions, and each of them provided an anal-
ysis as to how each case would be solved in their respective jurisdiction. The solutions to 
each of the two components per case were then coded jurisdiction by jurisdiction in terms 
of (1) the form, style, and substance of the legal rules applied, including the similarities and 
differences between those legal rules, (2) the underlying legal sources, and (3) the actual 
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results. The findings drawn in respect of (1), (2), and (3) are presented in Part III, below. In 
this Part we explain the method of the underlying project, the choice of countries and case 
studies, and the coding of the twenty components in more detail. 
B. The Case-Based Method and Practicalities  
1. Approaches to Comparative Law: The Functional Method 
It is a trite observation that a comparative analysis that starts with a particular legal 
feature (rule, concept, or institution) soon encounters difficulties if one of the legal systems 
under observation does not have that particular feature. Thus, many comparatists suggest 
that one should not start with a specific legal topic but with a functional question, such as a 
particular socio-economic problem. In the words of Ernst Rabel, it means that “rather than 
comparing fixed data and isolated paragraphs, we compare the solutions produced by one 
state for a specific factual situation, and then we ask why they were produced and what 
success they had.”72 The most striking example of such an approach is the Common Core 
project adopted by European academics interested in contract, tort, and property law.73 
However, this approach has also had its critics, who have challenged the assumptions of the 
functionalist method. For example, some commentators regard the assumption that all so-
cieties face the same social problems as unacceptable;74 they argue that human needs are 
not universal but are conditioned by their environments. Moreover, it is not at all untypical 
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that law operates to serve more than one explicit function alone. Meanwhile, others chal-
lenge the very idea that law serves particular functions. Legal rules may arise pursuant to a 
complex process of historical path-dependencies, cultural preconditions, and legal trans-
plants, and such rules also shape the problems of society.  
However, we submit that these objections do not discredit functionalism as a whole. 
In fact, the aspiration is that this case-based project will serve to underscore how the use of 
hypothetical cases can offer important insights in the field of comparative corporate law. It 
may also be seen as providing evidence that practical problems in corporate law are not so 
diverse across the ten countries selected as to make a case-based comparison worthless.75  
In the next subsection, we address the practicalities of the case-based project dis-
cussed in this Article, in particular the choice of countries and the procedure applied. 
2. The Choice of Countries—and the Modus Operandi of the Project 
In accordance with one of the objectives of the project identified above, i.e. whether 
formal harmonization of corporate law in the EU—or further afield—is necessary, desir-
able, or at all possible, our main focus in this study76 was on the Member States of the EU. 
However, owing to constraints of space, it was not possible for us to cover the law of all 
twenty-eight Member States. Therefore, our focus was fixed on the most populated coun-
tries (Germany, France, the United Kingdom, Spain, Italy, and Poland) as well as on two 
smaller and more recently acceded Member States (Finland and Latvia). In addition, we 
included the laws of two of the largest economies of the world, the United States and Japan; 
their laws are significant and interesting from a comparative perspective, since the United 
States is the most important “exporter” of corporate governance theories and ideas, and Ja-
pan’s corporate law is comprised of a mixture of different legal traditions, having had a 
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number of legal transplants over time. We should clarify that the law of the U.S. state of 
Delaware was used as a proxy for the United States as a whole. This is attributable to the 
fact that Delaware corporate law is the most important and influential in the United States, 
with a significant number of public and private companies incorporated in that state.77 
 Our coordination of the project entailed the appointment of one or two national re-
porters for each of the ten jurisdictions under examination. We also selected the topics of 
each of the ten hypothetical cases, with the issues to be addressed in each case loosely con-
figured around the issues of directors’ duties, creditor protection, shareholder du-
ties/liabilities, and the flexibility of corporate law and its enforcement.78 Each of the na-
tional reporters performed three tasks. First, he or she drafted one hypothetical case and a 
solution to that case according to the corporate law of his or her home jurisdiction. The de-
cision to enable each participant to draft one of the cases was predicated on the perceived 
need to achieve a good mix and balance of cases, possibly reflecting different socio-
economic circumstances. Secondly, the national reporters then circulated their hypothetical 
cases and solutions amongst the other national reporters, who produced solutions to the 
other nine cases under the law of their home jurisdictions. Thirdly, each national reporter 
examined the different solutions to his or her hypothetical case and drew up a comparative 
conclusion.  
 In examining the solutions to the ten cases provided by the national reporters, cer-
tain problems had to be overcome. For example, the solutions received from the contribu-
tors often differed considerably in terms of structure and style. However, a template on how 
the solutions should be written and structured was deliberately not provided. Comparative 
lawyers often emphasize that it is differences in legal style, not substantive rules, which are 
decisive for the common/civil law divide.79 Thus, to some extent, this project had the sec-
ondary aim of exposing these differences in legal thinking and writing. However, this point 
should not be stretched too far. For example, if a particular national solution contained 
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many references to academic literature, this may be an indicator of the civil law tradition,80 
but it could also be influenced by the individual style adopted by the national reporter in 
question. 
C. The Ten Hypothetical Cases 
The ten cases were selected in order to cover topics of directors’ duties and liabili-
ties (cases one to four); creditor protection, including the relationship between creditors and 
the company (cases five to six); and the law relating to shares, shareholders, shareholder 
protection, and the flexibility of corporate law (cases seven to ten). The ten hypothetical 
cases devised are available online for review.81 The adoption of this approach has the po-
tential to reveal the extent to which the legal systems selected favor the interests of direc-
tors, majority shareholders, minority shareholders, or creditors. This feeds into the higher-
order abstract debates in the wider comparative corporate law literature on the relevance of 
legal origins, “convergence versus divergence,” and legal transplants, discussed in Part I. 
Furthermore, it has the scope to corroborate or refute the argument that agency costs in 
common law jurisdictions are oriented towards the minimization of vertical agency costs, 
and that legally constructed constraints of horizontal agency costs represent the focus of 
civilian systems of corporate law. 
 We also took the view that the cases ought to address different types of companies. 
Thus, the aim was to have a good mix of scenarios dealing with smaller, medium-sized, and 
more substantial companies. Four of the cases asked for a solution based on the applicable 
law of private limited liability companies. Meanwhile, the remaining six cases concerned 
public companies (i.e. joint-stock companies), some of which had their shares admitted to a 
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stock exchange/regulated market.82 The cases are set out in greater detail in the following 
three subsections. 
1. Directors’ Duties and Liability 
The first four cases address the position of the ten jurisdictions in respect of direc-
tors’ duties and liabilities. The focus of the first case was twofold. First, it sought to under-
stand the source, nature, content, and scope of a director’s duties of loyalty and care. Sec-
ondly, Case 1 evaluated the ability of the shareholders in a general meeting to ex ante au-
thorize or ex post ratify a breach of a director’s duty. Meanwhile, Case 2 investigated the 
parameters of the legal obligations of nominee directors and the status of promissory notes 
that are convertible into equity. The third case addressed the nature of the duties of direc-
tors in a particular context where managerial loyalties may be conflicted, namely that of a 
takeover bid. It also sought to identify where the line is drawn between the powers of the 
directors and the shareholders to take a particular form of defensive action in the case of a 
takeover bid. The fourth case likewise takes a takeover situation as its focus. However, un-
like the third case, the principal concern of Case 4 was to identify the jurisdictions that ap-
ply pre-emption rights on the allotment and issue of shares by a company. In other words, 
the question was to what extent a company must first offer a fresh issue of shares to the ex-
isting shareholders before it is entitled to issue shares to non-shareholder third parties. 
2. Creditor Protection 
Two cases dealt with questions of creditor protection. The fifth case, which relates 
to the law of creditor protection, assesses the ability of a creditor of a bankrupt company to 
seek recourse against the shareholders or directors of that company. The first issue is 
whether a doctrine such as “piercing the veil of incorporation” or some other similar doc-
trine would permit the creditor to look behind the façade of the separate legal personality of 
the company to enable it to enforce against the bankrupt company’s directors or sharehold-
ers. Secondly, we asked national reporters to consider the potential for direct creditor re-
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course against the directors of the bankrupt company via the medium of directors’ duties. In 
the sixth case, the focus shifted to the operation of the capital maintenance principle found 
in the domestic corporate law systems of many European jurisdictions as well as in EU 
company law.83 It also addressed the degree to which the corporate laws of the jurisdictions 
concerned prohibits or constrains the capacity of companies to effect “disguised distribu-
tions” of assets to the detriment of creditors, e.g. by transferring assets to a third party or 
particular shareholder(s) at undervalue or by acquiring assets from a third party or particu-
lar shareholder(s) in excess of their market value.  
3. Shareholders’ Rights and Protections and the Flexibility of Corporate Law 
The remaining four cases concentrated on the general rights and protections of 
shareholders and the flexibility of corporate law. Case 7 sought to establish whether share-
holders have an entitlement to challenge the decisions of majority shareholders where the 
latter have failed consistently to vote in favor of the distribution of an annual dividend over 
a period of time. The second matter addressed by this case was whether the vote of an in-
terested shareholder in favor of merging the company with another company is somehow 
tainted and can be ignored on the grounds that it is null and void. Meanwhile, the eighth 
case looked to understand the circumstances in which shareholders have a right to ask ques-
tions of management at a general meeting. It also analyzed the legal effect of a purported 
breach of shareholder rights and whether this operates to invalidate any resolutions passed 
at a general meeting. Case 9 highlighted the legal processes recognized in the various juris-
dictions that enable shareholders to enforce their rights. One of the key issues addressed 
was whether it is possible for an aggrieved minority shareholder to challenge a breach of 
directors’ duties or the actions of a controlling shareholder through the medium of a deriva-
tive action, including the qualifying conditions imposed on such litigation. Secondly, the 
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flexibility of the corporate law regimes of the ten jurisdictions was also analyzed. National 
reporters were asked to consider whether it is possible for a decision to be taken informally 
by the shareholders with unanimous consent where corporate law rules or the terms of the 
company’s constitution specifically require a formal vote to be taken at a properly con-
vened general meeting of the shareholders. Finally, the purpose of the tenth case was to 
consider whether any legal constraints are placed on the ability of shareholders to restrict 
the free transfer of shares in the company’s constitution, e.g. through the application of pre-
emption rights on the transfer of shares in favor of existing shareholders, and whether a 
company is able to restrict a third party from inheriting shares upon the death of a share-
holder.  
D. The Coding of the Twenty Components 
The ten case studies involved in the research deal with a variety of legal topics. 
Thus, we abstracted two components for each case and coded those for each country. Then, 
we addressed the resulting twenty components at three levels, namely (1) the similarities 
and differences in terms of the legal rules, (2) the underlying legal sources, and (3) the ac-
tual results. The full codings are available online.84 Table 1 illustrates how one of the two 
components of Case 6 on creditor protection was coded. 
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TABLE 1. CODING EXAMPLE FOR “VEIL PIERCING” (CASE 6, FIRST COMPONENT)85 
 FRA GER ITA SPA FIN POL LAT UK US JP 
A B B B B C C B B B Legal rules 
Explanation: concept of fictitious company (A); concept of piercing the corpo-
rate veil (B); no such concepts (C) 
C C L,A C C,A N N C C C Sources of law 
Explanation: legislation (L); courts (C); academics (A) (if cited as a quasi-
source of law, instead of a further reference); (N) problem unknown (i.e. no 
law). 
C S S S S S S S S S Results  
Explanation: result favoring shareholders (S); creditors (C). 
With respect to the category “legal rules,” the coding was influenced by two conflicting 
considerations. On the one hand, for the purposes of the subsequent analysis, it would have 
been pointless to consider each of the ten legal systems as unique. On the other hand, it 
would have been equally uninteresting to say that at their core, all legal systems tend to be 
similar. Thus, we coded the twenty components with the aim of identifying between two 
and four groups of countries , such as three (A, B, C) in Table 1. 
The coding of “sources of law” was understood in a functional way. For instance, 
case law and academic writings have been included notwithstanding that they are not re-
garded as a source of law in a technical sense in all jurisdictions. In addition to the catego-
ries shown in Table 1, in some of the twenty components the legal responses were based on 
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self-regulation (such as corporate governance codes) or left to the discretion of the com-
pany (e.g., its articles of association). 
The final category codes the results of the twenty components. In the example of 
Table 1, there were only two options, namely that this particular component of the case pro-
tects the interests of either the shareholders or the creditors. In some of the other cases we 
also coded the conflict between the interests of shareholders and directors, on the one hand, 
and minority and majority shareholders, on the other.86 In some instances, we also had to 
code a country as not providing a clear answer to the component in question. 
III. MAIN COMPARATIVE FINDINGS  
 A. Introduction 
Based on the coding explained in the previous Part, this Part entails an evaluation of 
the nature and content of the respective legal rules of corporate law, the sources of those 
rules, and the results reached on the application of such rules. This approach enables quan-
tification of similarities and differences, going beyond anecdotal examples. Since any quan-
titative information needs to be interpreted, paradigmatic cases are also referred to where 
necessary. 
The following caveats need to be made. First, such data are sensitive to the design 
of the cases. Yet, we hope that the assignment of each national reporter to draft one of the 
cases achieved a good mix of cases. As the organizers of the project, we coordinated the 
drafting of the cases so as to strike a balance between cases addressing private and public 
companies, as well as between cases dealing with the core topics of directors’ duties, credi-
tor protection, and shareholders’ rights.87 It may also be noted that the subjective element in 
the selection of variables is by no means unique to the current study.88 Secondly, the solu-
tions to each case were drafted by one or sometimes two local lawyers; other lawyers from 
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the same jurisdictions may not have provided exactly the same answers. To mitigate against 
idiosyncrasy in this regard, as the project organizers, we read all solutions and requested 
further explanations and references, in particular where we found that a solution as submit-
ted by a reporter did not sound entirely plausible. We also asked the national reporters to 
clarify whether their legal solutions were likely to be shared by other lawyers from their 
countries, in circumstances where there was a degree of doubt as to that solution.  
B. Comparison of Legal Rules 
The coding of the legal rules according to the twenty components offered the oppor-
tunity to assess the similarities and differences between the ten countries. For this purpose 
the coded attributes (cf. Table 1) needed to be converted into relations showing the differ-
ences between each pair of countries.89 This is achieved by ascertaining whether each vari-
able in the law of a particular country corresponds to that of any of the other nine countries, 
whereby each observation of difference was coded as “1”. Subsequently, the absolute val-
ues of these differences are added together. For example, the coding in Table 1 shows that 
France and Germany have different rules that govern the topic of veil piercing (the first 
component of Case 6). Thus, for this component, the difference between France and Ger-
many is “1.” A corresponding procedure was applied to all twenty components. Adding all 
of those numbers together led to the result that, for example, in fifteen out of twenty com-
ponents, France and Germany have different legal rules.  
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TABLE 2. MATRIX OF DIFFERENCES IN LEGAL RULES (MAX 20, MIN 0)  
 FRA GER ITA SPA FIN POL LAT UK US JP Mean 
FRA  15 9 9 14 12 11 12 13 13 12 
GER 15  9 10 11 8 10 13 16 13 11.67 
ITA 9 9  8 11 8 10 12 10 12 9.89 
SPA 9 10 8  10 8 6 11 10 12 9.33 
FIN 14 11 11 10  10 12 11 14 17 12.22 
POL 12 8 8 8 10  6 15 14 15 10.67 
LAT 11 10 10 6 12 6  13 13 14 10.56 
UK 12 13 12 11 11 15 13  11 11 12.11 
US 13 16 10 10 14 14 13 11  10 12.33 
JP 13 13 12 12 17 15 14 11 10  13 
 
The outcome of this process is the matrix of differences in Table 2. It reveals which coun-
tries are most similar to and different from the other nine. The result is that Japan and the 
United States are the most “eccentric” and Spain and Italy are the most “mainstream” (see 
the final column). This may reflect the fact that Japan and the United States are the only 
non-EU countries involved in the case-based study. Though it has sometimes been said that 
EU harmonization is trivial in corporate law,90 a number of the case solutions written by the 
national reporters referred to the EU Directives, for instance, as far as takeovers are con-
cerned, on questions of capital maintenance and the right of shareholders to ask questions 
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in the general meeting.91 The “mainstreamness” of Spain and Italy also makes sense since 
the corporate laws of these countries have been influenced by both the French and the 
German legal traditions. However, overall, even the most similar countries have different 
legal rules in more than nine out of twenty components, thus showing that the convergence 
of corporate laws has not led to identical rules.  
It is interesting to see whether certain intuitive expectations about similarities are 
confirmed or refuted. The most similar pairs in Table 2 are Latvia–Poland and Latvia–
Spain, followed by Spain–Italy, Spain–Poland, Germany–Poland, and Italy–Poland. These 
results may show that European civil law countries are relatively similar, as one would ex-
pect. With respect to the United Kingdom and the United States, however, the difference 
between them is considerable, and at least as high as some of the differences which arise 
between them and civil law countries. For example, this can be seen in the case studies on 
takeovers, as well as those on shareholder rights and litigation.92 Similarly, the literature 
frequently points towards differences between U.K. and U.S. corporate law, in terms of 
both the legal rules and the law in action.93 There is also no evidence of an “Americaniza-
tion” of continental European countries, since the United States is not particularly close to 
any of them. Finally, Table 2 shows that Japanese corporate law is closer to that of the Un-
tied States, as well as to that of the United Kingdom, than it is to the law of any of the civil 
law countries, thus confirming the Japanese shift towards the U.S. system, at least as far as 
the positive rules are concerned.94 For instance, the lack of general pre-emption rights and 
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the availability of derivative actions are features of Japanese law that are shared with the 
United States, and make it different from most continental European countries.95  
The relative proximity of the jurisdictions to one another can be presented as a net-
work.96 For this purpose, the information about each of the pairs was entered into a network 
analysis program (UCINET) enabling us to represent only those “ties” (i.e. relationships 
between countries) that are below a particular threshold. In Figure 1, the ties with a value of 
eleven or less (see Table 2) are displayed, and the more similar the country pair the bolder 
the tie in the figure. In addition, using the technique of multidimensional scaling, the net-
work analysis program has shifted the position of nodes according to the strength of their 
relationships, so that countries whose laws are relatively similar are moved closer together.  
FIGURE 1. NETWORK BASED ON SIMILARITY OF LEGAL RULES (WITH TWO CLUSTERS) 
 
As Figure 1 illustrates, the legal rules in Spain, Latvia, and Poland are very close to one an-
other, and are also relatively proximate to the other continental countries (Germany, Fin-
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land, Italy, and France). There are two links each between the United States and the United 
Kingdom with continental European countries, but overall the United Kingdom, the United 
States, and Japan are relatively distant from all other countries. It can further be seen that 
the United States and Japan are relatively close. 
Network analysis also provides tools to identify community structures.97 For the 
purpose of this Article, we calculated “optimization clusters,” a formal method that 
“[o]ptimizes a cost function which measures the total distance or similarity within classes 
for a proximity matrix.”98 The user has to determine how many clusters will be created in 
advance. The coloring of the nodes in Figure 1 is based on a division into two clusters 
which shows the aforementioned divide between the seven continental European countries 
and the three other countries. 
We also calculated divisions into more clusters. It is then possible to compare the 
“fit” of these various divisions, finding that the best fit is achieved if the data are divided 
into five clusters:99 (1) the United States and Japan, (2) Germany, Italy, Spain, Poland, and 
Latvia, and finally (3) Finland, (4) the United Kingdom, and (5) France each set out on 
their own. This result produces the observation that the French civilian system of corporate 
law stands apart from the German strand of the civil law, as well as the Spanish, Italian, and 
Eastern European jurisdictions. It also substantiates the point articulated above that the 
U.K. common law regime is not as closely aligned to that of the United States as is often 
assumed. Another notable point is that the identification of the five clusters demonstrates 
the extent to which the German civil law tradition exerts a degree of pull and influence over 
the legal systems of Italy and Spain, which are more commonly aligned with the French 
civilian legal family. This causes us to question whether the traditional distinction between 
the German and French branches of the civil law has any meaningful field of application in 
the area of corporate law. 
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C. Comparison of Underlying Sources of Law 
Comparative lawyers often highlight differences in the prevalent sources of law. It is 
frequently asserted that case law is more important in common law jurisdictions, whereas in 
civil law countries, the codes and academic writings tend to play a stronger role.100 In addi-
tion, the corporate law and corporate governance literature claims that corporate law rules 
are frequently mandatory in continental European legal systems, in contrast to Anglo-Saxon 
firms, which are said to enjoy a greater degree of flexibility.101 Thus, there may also be dif-
ferences in the extent to which questions are left to self-regulation and the articles of asso-
ciation/corporate bylaws. But this is not without controversy, as one of us has previously 
written: 
All the same, in the countries studied here [France, Germany, Japan, China, 
the United States, and the United Kingdom] convergence in shareholder law 
has come about. This can be seen, first, in the relevant legal bases . . . . [T]here 
are similar basic patterns, with codifications of company and securities law be-
ing supplemented by case law, articles of association, shareholder agreements 
and corporate governance codes. Moreover, market forces play an important 
part, without a legal system necessarily on that account giving up statutory 
control mechanisms.102 
The evidence from the current case-based project is mixed. For example, two of the case 
solutions show that civilian systems of corporate law may be more inflexible than their 
common law counterparts inasmuch as the former are more likely to prohibit or restrict the 
ability of companies to (i) include provisions in their articles which prevent the heir of a 
deceased shareholder from inheriting the latter’s shares and (ii) issue debt securities con-
vertible into equity.103 However, this can be contrasted with two other findings, which con-
firm that both civilian and common law jurisdictions recognize (i) the highly flexible in-
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formal unanimous consent rule or a functional equivalent in their corporate laws and (ii) the 
validity of pre-emption provisions on share transfers in the articles of their companies, with 
or without restrictions. 104 
More comprehensively, the sources of law determining the results in respect of each 
of the twenty components have been identified.105 Table 3 presents the results. 
TABLE 3. PREVALENCE OF SOURCES OF LAW (MAX 20, THREE HIGHEST VALUES HIGH-
LIGHTED) 
  FRA GER ITA SPA FIN POL LAT UK US JP 
Legislation 17 17 19 17 18 16 17 15 8 18 
Case law 11 13 5 3 2 2 1 15 15 10 
Academic 1 11 7 9 3 6 2 0 0 2 
Self-regulation 0 0 0 1 2 0 0 4 0 0 
Discretion 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 
None 0 0 1 0 1 3 3 0 2 1 
It can be seen that legislation is the most relevant source for at least 75% of the components 
(i.e. fifteen) in all legal systems except the United States. The difference between the Unit-
ed Kingdom and the United States may be surprising, but it is not wholly implausible. The 
frequent reforms of U.K. corporate law have expanded the scope and detail of the Compa-
nies Act. For example, in the U.K. Companies Act 2006, topics such as directors’ duties 
                                                 
104
 See id., chs. 10–11. 
105
 See supra Part II.D. 
 38 
 
have now been partly codified, whereas even in civil law countries such as France and 
Germany, these are still largely based on case law.106  
The data also show that case law is not only important in the United Kingdom and 
the United States but also in Germany, France, and Japan. It plays less of a role, however, 
in the jurisdictions with a smaller pool of case law, possibly because they have relatively 
new corporate laws (Poland, Latvia) or because they are relatively small jurisdictions (Fin-
land, Latvia). It is also worth pointing out that to say that case law plays a role in both civil 
and common law countries does not mean that their actual mode of operation is identical in 
practice; for instance, there may still be differences in terms of the prevalent judicial ap-
proach, such as whether to adopt legal reasoning based on ideas of justice or efficiency. 
Academic research plays a significant role in many of the case solutions from Ger-
many, Italy, and Spain, whereas it was not decisive for the United Kingdom and the United 
States. This could be viewed as confirming the difference between the civil law—in par-
ticular its German variant—and common law.107 As with case law, it may also make sense 
that academic writing is less important in smaller jurisdictions (Finland, Latvia) than in lar-
ger ones.  
The final three categories were revealed to be important in only a limited number of 
countries. However, these remaining differences can be explained. Self-regulation plays a 
relatively important role in U.K. corporate law, for instance with respect to takeovers.108 In 
the United States, there are a few instances where there is simply no law at all or the deci-
sion is left to the discretion of the company; this is to be explained by the “light approach” 
in regulating the internal affairs of companies109 that has been adopted by Delaware, the 
corporate seat of almost half of the listed companies in the United States. Finally, Poland 
and Latvia have only relatively recently promulgated a set of corporate laws. Therefore, it 
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is perhaps unsurprising that in a few instances a response was received to the effect that a 
particular legal problem or solution was not yet known. 
Does the preference for a particular source of law vary between private limited 
companies (such as the “Ltd.” in the United Kingdom and the “GmbH” in Germany) and 
public companies (i.e. joint-stock companies such as the U.K.’s “plc” and the German 
“AG”)? The scenarios of the case studies underlying this Article always specified the type 
of company in question.110 Yet, it must also be considered that the form a company takes 
does not always correspond to the way it operates in practice. For example, on the surface, 
the French SARL resembles the German GmbH, and the French SA the German AG, but in 
France, even small to medium-sized firms and family firms often use the SA form. In addi-
tion, French law offers a third legal form, the SAS, which was created to cover the area be-
tween the SA and the SARL.111 The implication of these factors for the project was that 
while guidance was provided to national reporters on the type of company that was ex-
pected to be covered in each of the individual case studies, some contributors indicated 
possible alternative solutions for different types of companies. On occasion, national re-
porters also mentioned that a particular aim could not be pursued by adopting the form of 
company prescribed in the scenario in question, but that another form of company would 
have to be used or would be available.  
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TABLE 4. PREVALENCE OF SOURCES OF LAW 
 Total Cases on Ltds Cases on plcs 
Legislation 81.00% 85.00% 78.33% 
Case law 38.50% 36.25% 40.00% 
Academic 20.50% 26.25% 16.67% 
Self-regulation 3.50% 0.00% 5.83% 
Discretion 1.00% 1.25% 0.83% 
None 5.50% 3.75% 6.67% 
Notwithstanding this caveat, it is possible to calculate the prevalence of the sources of law 
for Ltds and plcs. Table 4, above, shows that there are only small differences. To be sure, 
this is also a reflection of the scope of our project—its main focus was on topics of corpo-
rate law. If one were to consider rules specifically applicable to companies admitted to a 
stock exchange, listing rules and other forms of secondary regulation would play a decisive 
role for public companies.  
As in the previous section, the data can be transformed into a dataset showing the 
differences between countries. The matrix of differences, analogous to Table 2, is available 
in the online supplement.112 Hence, it is once again possible to produce a network picture, 
depicting the similarities and differences in terms of the sources of law.  
                                                 
112
 See Cabrelli & Siems, supra note 81.  
 41 
 
FIGURE 2: NETWORK BASED ON SIMILARITY OF SOURCES OF LAW (WITH TWO CLUSTERS) 
 
Figure 2 can be explained as follows (also drawing on the information from Table 3): Lat-
via, Finland, and Italy are fairly close since legislation is by far the most important source 
of law. Poland and Spain are also similar to those countries, but here the academic literature 
also plays a role. Thereafter, Germany, France, and Japan share some affinities with the 
aforementioned jurisdictions, but case law is more influential in this regard. In France, the 
academic literature plays less of a role than in the other civil law countries. The United 
Kingdom is similar to France, but with a prominent role performed by self-regulation. Fi-
nally, the United States is very different from the other countries since it relies much less 
on legislation in corporate law than do the other nine countries. 
Figure 2 also shows the coloring of the nodes according to two clusters. Here, such 
a division of the dataset provides the best “fit.”113 It reflects a clear distinction between 
common and civil law countries, since the United Kingdom and the United States belong to 
one cluster, and the remaining eight countries to the other one. But, as the discussion of this 
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section has shown, this does not mean that there is not also a great deal of variation within 
these clusters. 
D. Comparison of Results 
As explained above,114 the ten cases of this book have been selected in order to cov-
er topics of directors’ duties and liabilities, creditor protection, including the relationship 
between creditors and the company, and the law relating to shares, shareholders, share-
holder protection, and the flexibility of corporate law. Thus, it was possible to examine 
whether legal systems tend to favor the interests of directors, shareholders, or creditors. In 
addition, it should be stressed that in companies with a dominant shareholder, the main con-
flict is often between minority and majority/controlling shareholders. The findings from 
this case-based research harbored the potential to answer the question whether: (1) civilian 
systems are indeed characterized by “insider/control-oriented” horizontal agency problems 
that are addressed by policies in corporate law preferring the interests of minority share-
holders, and (2) common law regimes prioritize the promulgation of rules in corporate law 
that seek to minimize vertical agency costs. All of this was reflected in the coding of the 
results for the twenty components.115 Table 5 aggregates those results and indicates the 
maximum that can be achieved in each of the categories, given that not all potential inter-
ests are addressed in each of those components.116 
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TABLE 5: PREFERENCE FOR INTERESTS OF DIRECTORS, SHAREHOLDERS AND CREDITORS 
(HIGHEST VALUES HIGHLIGHTED 117) 
  FRA GER ITA SPA FIN POL LAT UK US JP 
Directors (max. 
11) 6 5 6 6 4 3 6 6 9 4 
Shareholders 
(max. 11) 4 4 5 3 6 4 3 5 3 4 
Creditors (max. 
3) 2 2 1 2 1 2 2 1 1 2 
Majority share-
holders (max. 
8) 3 2 1 2 2 3 3 7 4 6 
Minority share-
holders (max. 
8) 4 5 4 2 4 4 4 1 0 1 
Unclear (max. 
20) 1 2 3 5 3 4 2 0 3 3 
In the context of the position of directors, Table 5 points towards U.S. exceptionalism since 
the US tends to favor directors more often than the other countries. This is in line with other 
studies that stress the predominance of the “director primacy” model in the U.S. corporate 
law system,118 while disaffirming the view expressed by Hansmann and Kraakman that 
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modern U.S. corporate law leads the way in having adopted a shareholder-oriented mod-
el.119 Some scholars have argued that the director primacy approach of U.S. corporate law 
has worked very well,120 though others have suggested that existing rights must be made 
more effective and that the power of shareholders to modify the company’s charter ought to 
be improved.121  
A possible complication concerns the private enforcement of rights, for instance 
through derivative actions. Here, it may be argued that the U.S. position is favorable to-
wards shareholders since the combination of contingency fees and the “American cost rule” 
creates good incentives to enforce breaches of directors’ duties—in contrast to the situation 
in other countries.122 Some of our case studies do also show that U.S. law is an effective 
system for the private enforcement of directors’ duties by shareholders. For example, along 
with France and Japan, in the United States, if a “demand requirement” is made that the 
company raise legal proceedings against the miscreant directors and the company fails to 
do so, a shareholder then has the right to raise a derivative action on behalf of the company 
against those directors. This can be contrasted with the more stringent preconditions ap-
plied in the context of a derivative action in Spain and Finland, where a shareholder must 
hold a minimum of five and ten per cent of the shares of the company respectively; it is 
likewise more stringent in the United Kingdom, where the courts apply statutory pre-
hearing criteria in a manner which is generally hostile to the continuation of derivative liti-
gation.123 
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But it is also plausible to address the protection of shareholders at an aggregate lev-
el. The empirical literature on corporate law frequently uses such aggregates.124 There has 
also been recent theoretical support for the use of aggregates and other composite indica-
tors. This is based on a “bundle perspective to comparative corporate governance” since a 
particular mechanism often depends on, or may be substituted, by other questions of corpo-
rate governance.125 Thus, despite its limitations, there is some justification to interpret the 
levels of protection at the aggregate level, as displayed in Table 5. 
Here, the relatively low level of shareholder protection in U.S. law raises doubts 
about the legal origins “story,” namely the argument that the comparatively robust share-
holder protection of common law countries has led to more dispersed shareholder owner-
ship and more developed capital markets.126 Additional evidence against the validity of the 
legal origins theorem is furnished by the observations drawn from four of our case studies 
insofar as they establish that (i) there are no major substantive differences in the degree to 
which shareholders are protected by the directors’ duty of care, skill, and loyalty; (ii) no 
major deviation between the United Kingdom (as a common law country) and the civilian 
jurisdictions is detectable in relation to the degree to which shareholders benefit from the 
right to ask questions, challenge a shareholders’ resolution, and/or block a merger owing to 
the occurrence of a procedural defect in the conduct of a general meeting; and (iii) each of 
the jurisdictions examined has mechanisms which enable minority shareholders to enforce 
a breach of directors’ duties, ranging from a mixture of derivative actions, personal actions, 
and the hybrid actio pro socio.127  
In Table 5, the United Kingdom performs well in the general category of share-
holder protection; nevertheless, it shares commonalities with the United States (as well as 
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Japan) insofar as the U.K. courts are generally more hostile to legal proceedings raised by 
the minority against the majority than are the courts of the continental European countries. 
For example, unlike the United Kingdom, our findings appear to indicate that civilian juris-
dictions such as Spain, Poland, Germany, Latvia, and Italy are receptive to minority share-
holder claims against the majority and, indeed, in certain civilian jurisdictions, the law im-
poses fiduciary duties on the controlling or majority shareholders which are owed to the 
minority.128 This can be explained by the relatively concentrated ownership structures of 
continental European companies, leading to the risk that the dominant shareholder exploits 
the minority. In the United Kingdom and the United States, shareholder ownership is more 
dispersed and therefore there may be less need to interfere with the principle of majority 
rule. Hence, there is indeed some evidence for the proposition that certain civil law systems 
appear to prioritize the eradication or minimization of horizontal agency costs more than 
common law jurisdictions by placing greater emphasis on duties owed by controlling 
shareholders to minority shareholders.129 However, this does not translate into a greater va-
riety or number of enforcement mechanisms than common law jurisdictions, since all of the 
jurisdictions surveyed contain means by which minority shareholders can seek redress 
against wrongdoing directors.130 
The remaining two categories of Table 5 have to be interpreted cautiously. Creditor 
protection seems to be stronger in most civil law countries than in the United Kingdom and 
the United States, which may reflect that in the former countries, bank finance is more im-
portant than market finance. Indeed, the findings from our case on “veil piercing” and re-
lated topics suggest that French and Japanese law are the most pro-creditor and the United 
States the least.131 However, since this category is based only on three variables, the results 
should not be overinterpreted, and it should also be stressed that the second case study on 
creditor protection revealed that creditors in all of the jurisdictions are protected by a di-
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verse assortment of rules or doctrines, ranging from capital maintenance rules, rules regu-
lating the payment of dividends, directors’ duties, the “piercing the corporate veil” doctrine, 
and fraudulent conveyance laws.132  
Finally, it is difficult to adduce why in a particular jurisdiction there were more 
“unclear” results indicated by the national reporters than in others. However, it may make 
sense that in U.K. corporate law there are no unclear results, reflecting its long history of 
codification and case law. Another factor is that in some jurisdictions a fact-specific situa-
tion or legal issue may not have been addressed in statute, a commercial code, or case law. 
As such, the absence of a default rule may be unsurprising, particularly in the newly ac-
ceded EU states included in the study. 
FIGURE 3: NETWORK BASED ON SIMILARITY OF RESULTS (WITH TWO CLUSTERS) 
 
As in the previous sections, the data can be transformed into a difference matrix, available 
in the online supplement,133 which is then used to produce a new network picture, Figure 3. 
It can be seen that the legal systems from continental Europe all feature in one half of Fig-
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ure 3. In particular, Germany, Poland, and Latvia are relatively close since they have slight-
ly lower shareholder protection but all score well in the creditor protection variable (see 
Table 5). Italy and Spain are also very close to each other. The other three countries are rel-
atively different from this continental group. This also includes the United Kingdom, re-
flecting the differences in minority shareholder protection (see Table 5). Interestingly, the 
United States is relatively close to Japan but not to the United Kingdom. 
Finally, as in the previous sections, we calculated the division into clusters. The best 
“fit” is achieved with two clusters.134 As illustrated by the colors of the  network in Figure 
3, we see the group of continental European countries, with the other cluster comprising the 
United Kingdom, the United States, and Japan.  
E. The Relationship between Legal Rules, Sources of Law, and Results 
Since the three “difference matrices” use the same measure (namely, how different 
each of the countries is from the others), they are useful tools for a combined analysis of 
legal rules, sources of law, and results. To start with, one can simply sum up the data and 
identify which pairs of countries are most similar. When the pairs are ranked, the result of 
this operation is that Latvia, Poland, Finland, Spain, and Italy are fairly similar since these 
countries share at least three of the top ten links with each other. Germany and France each 
have one of the top ten links, with Poland and Italy respectively. Finally, the United King-
dom, the United States, and Japan are at the periphery with no close links.135 
It may be a surprise to learn that none of the “main” legal systems is at the center. 
Yet this outcome is not implausible since Latvia, Poland, Finland, Spain, and Italy have 
been influenced by the “main” countries, thus explaining their relative similarity. Figures 1 
to 3 also show this result since these same five countries are usually at the center. It also 
confirms another quantitative study by one of us, which found that with respect to creditor 
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and shareholder protection in twenty-five countries, transplant countries were typically the 
countries most similar to the other twenty-four.136 
In addition, it is interesting to examine the relationship between these three catego-
ries. First, we calculated whether and how formal rules, sources of law, and results are cor-
related (i.e. from -1 to 1). The correlation between the sources of law and the other two cat-
egories is positive yet relatively modest (0.37 and 0.42), but there is a strong positive corre-
lation between formal legal rules and results (0.84). Of course correlation does not imply 
causation. Thus, secondly, we also calculated the extent to which the differences in results 
are determined by the differences in formal rules and/or the sources of law. The resulting 
regression shows that the legal rules are strongly significant but the sources of law are 
not.137 
This regularity does not mean that the content of the legal rules is automatically re-
flected in the results. This may be due on the one hand to the fact that the positive law may 
be similar but applied differently, for instance because a legal transplant does not work as 
well as it does in the origin country (“transplant effect”).138 On the other hand, it may be 
suggested that even where the positive law is different, the results may be similar since dif-
ferent legal rules can be functional equivalents.139 
 To assess this point, one may compare the mean differences of the three categories. 
These are 57% for formal rules, 46% for sources of law, and 50% for the results. Thus, 
considering the 7% gap between formal rules and results, it may follow that there are some 
formal differences which functionally lead to the same result. However, a problem with this 
reasoning is that in our dataset, the category results usually only had three options per com-
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ponent (e.g. protecting shareholders, protecting directors, or “unclear”), whereas there were 
more options in the formal rules category.140 Consequently, this feature of the dataset may 
be the main reason why there appear to be more differences in terms of formal rules.  
A more suitable method for establishing the relationship between formal rules and 
results is to examine selected pairs of countries. This has been done in Table 6. 
TABLE 6: DIFFERENCES FROM MEAN FOR SELECTED PAIRS OF COUNTRIES 
 GER–LAT US–JP UK–FRA UK–GER UK–US 
Legal rules -1.38 -1.38 0.62 1.62 -0.38 
Sources of law 2.37 -0.46 -2.29 -0.29 -1.13 
Results -4.93 -2.93 1.07 2.07 0.07 
The table is to be read as follows: each column displays how similar the indicated coun-
tries’ laws are in the three categories. The point of comparison is the mean of the category 
in question. Thus, the negative number of -1.38 in the GER–LAT column indicates that 
Germany and Latvia are closer than average in terms of legal rules, while the number 2.37 
means that with respect to the sources of law, Germany and Latvia are relatively different, 
as compared to the average.141 
One might expect that Germany and Latvia, as well as the United States and Japan, 
have relatively similar formal rules since Latvia borrowed some of its corporate law from 
Germany, and Japan did the same from the United States. But perhaps these legal trans-
plants did not come to function in the same way as in their original jurisdictions, as they 
became shaped by the socio-economic, political, and cultural context of the host jurisdic-
tions.142 Conversely, one may expect that the relationship between the United Kingdom on 
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the one hand and France and Germany on the other shows functional equivalence; due to 
their different legal traditions, they may have different legal rules, but the results could 
nonetheless be relatively similar. 
Table 6, however, does not confirm these points. The country pairs of Germany–
Latvia and the United States–Japan are closer in their results than in their legal rules, and 
the United Kingdom is more different than both France and Germany with respect to results 
than with respect to legal rules. It may also be surprising that, in terms of sources of law, 
the United Kingdom and France are even closer than the United Kingdom and the United 
States. Thus, the general theories of comparative law do not seem to hold in the context of 
corporate law. This sounds like a negative conclusion, possibly also due to the limitations 
of the present approach.143 However, it may also be put in a more positive light, namely 
that there is no support for the proposition that transplanted laws cannot work as well as 
non-transplanted ones.144 
A final point that can be examined is whether case law generates more different re-
sults than other sources of law, in particular statute law. Thus, first, the mean differences of 
the three categories were recalculated, focusing on the solutions that refer to case law. 
Here, the difference between formal rules is 43% (compared to 57% for all sources of law) 
and between the actual results is 53% (compared to 50% for all sources of law). This is not 
necessarily surprising. Topics where case law is important, such as directors’ duties, may 
have legal rules that are fairly similar across countries. However, differences in the results 
may be more pronounced since courts are keen to apply these rules to the specific socio-
economic context of the country in question. 
Second, a recalculation was performed to determine whether courts have a greater 
tendency than legislatures to protect shareholders. The background to this question is that 
some have argued that the common law countries are better at protecting shareholders since 
their courts are more alive to the protection of property rights, whereas legislatures more 
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often pursue other aims, such as the redistribution of resources.145 The data we have col-
lected shows that 46% of the solutions with case law favor shareholder protection, whereas 
the figure falls to 42% in the case of all sources of law. Thus, there is (only) a slight differ-
ence. 
Moreover, one can calculate which countries drive this result. For this purpose, the 
focus should be on France, Germany, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States, 
since only in these five countries were the national reporters’ solutions based on case law to 
a considerable extent.146 The results show that in France and Germany, court involvement 
is associated with an increase in shareholder protection, whereas in the other three coun-
tries, the tendency to protect shareholders is unaffected by the question of whether case law 
is relevant for one of the solutions.147 Thus, according to our data, common law courts do 
not appear to be especially interested in the protection of shareholders. 
The findings of this Part also have implications for the debate about harmonization 
in corporate law and the counterargument that it can only lead to formal harmonization and 
fails to respond to the need for functionally equivalent legal rules. Yet, our results do not 
confirm such skepticism. It was not possible to confirm functional similarity with formal 
dissimilarity (or formal similarity with function dissimilarity) which also means that it was 
not possible to find a “transplant effect” in countries that have been influenced by foreign 
legal rules. In addition, there is a strong positive correlation between the content of legal 
rules and the actual results: thus, formal harmonization can work insofar as law-makers 
possess a willingness to achieve common standards, for instance in the protection of share-
holders or creditors. 
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SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
In this Article, we have shown how a case-based approach can contribute to com-
parative corporate law, by informing our understanding of the extent to which the legal sys-
tems explored have fundamentally similar corporate law rules and sources of corporate law, 
as well as the nature of the results reached on the application of such rules. The study was 
based on ten cases used in a wider research project148 and their solutions in ten countries: 
eight European countries, the United States, and Japan. It may be suggested that further 
countries, for example from emerging economies or the developing world, should also have 
been included. Yet such an inclusion may have also been contentious, since the present 
comparison of market economies of the developed world has the advantage that it can as-
sess the remaining differences against a baseline of similarity in terms of the countries’ his-
tories, societies, economies, and ideologies.149 For example, if we had included a country 
such as China, a number of further considerations may have needed to be considered, such 
as the role of state ownership in corporate governance and the independence of the courts. 
Yet, even limited to the countries discussed here, the following conclusions can be 
drawn from our findings. The first is that it is not possible to confirm a global convergence, 
in particular a general Americanization, of corporate laws. According to our data, there is 
some evidence of legal transplants, for example as regards the relationship of Japanese to 
U.S. corporate law. Yet, overall, in all three categories—legal rules, sources of law, and 
results—the United States is the outlier. Hence, we do not find evidence for Hansmann and 
Kraakman’s view of “an end of history for corporate law” with the modern U.S. model of 
corporate law having won the day.150 Moreover, it would appear that both the United States 
and Japan are relatively different from the European countries of the study, thus raising 
some doubts about a global convergence of corporate laws. 
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Secondly, the question of Europeanization of corporate law is more difficult to an-
swer. There is some evidence that the EU Directives have led to some convergence of cor-
porate laws. Still, the U.K. system of corporate law is a bit of an outlier in terms of the na-
ture of the rules, the sources of those rules, and the outcome reached when such rules are 
applied. Moreover, it is remarkable that even the continental European countries differ con-
siderably. For instance, while the two Eastern European countries of our study (Latvia and 
Poland) have transplanted some rules from other legal systems, there are still notable dif-
ferences in the underlying sources of law, in particular in the role played by case law. There 
are also differences remaining in the protection of shareholders, even within continental 
Europe, with Spain providing less protection than the other civil law countries. Thus, while 
there is some evidence for the convergence of legal systems, even in a relatively homoge-
neous region such as the EU, there is no “end of history for corporate law.” 
Thirdly, one should be skeptical about the role of legal families. There are some 
similarities between the United Kingdom and the United States in terms of sources of law, 
yet case law also plays an important role in Germany, France, and Japan. One of our find-
ings shows that, possibly due to their more concentrated ownership structures, the civil law 
countries of continental Europe provide stronger protection for minority shareholders 
against the majority than do the United Kingdom and the United States. But, more gener-
ally, many of the similarities and differences in legal rules and actual results do not align 
with the categories of legal families. More specifically, the findings do not confirm the hy-
pothesis that the case law of common law countries is a crucial determinant for their high 
levels of shareholder protection; rather, if case law has an influence on shareholder protec-
tion, according to our data, this appears to be most pronounced in France and Germany. 
All of this also leads to the rejection of the findings by La Porta et al., who have 
claimed that the more robust shareholder protection of the common law countries is crucial 
to their more dispersed shareholder ownership and more developed capital markets.151 As a 
consequence, it also seems misconceived to make the policy claim that a high level of 
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shareholder protection (or perhaps particular types of legal rules) is essential for capital 
market development. 
